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From Parameters, Autumn 1998, pp. 121-35.
"To conquer the command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of
whatever terms the enemy may be pleased to impose." -- Giulio Douhet[1]

The effect of technology on warfare often has colored the predictions of theorists, elevating to eternal truths what we
discover in retrospect to have been passing historical epochs. Free of the context of the 1920s, Douhet seems dazzled
by the revolutionary possibilities of air power. He cannot be criticized for not anticipating anti-aircraft radar and
surface-to-air missiles, nor were he and his contemporaries alert to the continued success of low-tech, ground-based
asymmetric strategies of determined, resilient adversaries. But one word--Vietnam--provides a corrective to his
assertions. Air power has had a tremendous effect on warfare, but it simply has not lived up to Douhet's prediction that
it would be the decisive factor in all future conflicts.
Current interest in information warfare and the manifold effects of the information revolution on the conduct of war
cause many to proclaim a revolution in warfare. Evangelists of information warfare, like forerunner evangelists of air
power, sea power, and artillery, risk losing sight of historical context and the continuities of conflict. We are once
again faced with a genuine technological revolution which seems to offer an entirely new mode of warfare, one that
advocates insist will supplant existing modes. Thus military theorists and defense planners are once again challenged
to use new technologies for the competitive advantages they may offer on the battlefield, while bearing in mind their
limitations.
This article reviews the effects of information technologies on military theory, tempered by insights into the
consequences of previous technological revolutions. Issues emerge that are independent of any technology or
international security environment. They include an appraisal of the ability of contemporary analysts and theorists to
challenge promises of unprecedented change, and an examination of the theoretical implications of the so-called
"revolution in military affairs." Related issues include the need to avoid being dazzled by the new technologies (while
not exaggerating their significance) and at the same time appreciating the extraordinary near-term advantages and
capabilities they afford. Finally there is the matter of balance. We must use the technologies to advantage, neither
misapplying them in haste nor hesitating until we miss the opportunities they represent.
Technology, Society, and War
The enormous popularity of The Third Wave and War and Anti-War has given currency to the notion that historical
epochs--and the wars that go with them--are characterized by revolutionary technological breakthroughs that cause
"waves" of socioeconomic change.[2] According to the authors of those texts, Alvin and Heidi Toffler, the first
(agrarian) wave was characterized by animal domestication and agricultural cultivation; the second (industrial) wave by
mechanization, mass production, and the division of labor; and the emerging third (information) wave by digitization,
computers, and information technologies.
While the Tofflers' thesis is less than perfect,[3] they are generally correct with respect to the goals of warfare imposed
by the prevailing socioeconomic frameworks of the various epochs. Successful pre-industrial war was generally
predicated on the seizure of territorial assets, control of them, or both. Successful industrial age war was about
reducing the means of production and out-manufacturing one's opponent--dubbed schlachtmaterial by the Germans

during World War I. If the analogy holds, the advance guard of Pentagon theorists and defense analysts contends,
future wars will be waged for control of data, information, and knowledge assets.
Weapons of war also reflect the dominant aspects of each era's socioeconomic paradigm. Rifled arms, iron-clad ships,
machine guns, tanks, and aircraft depict the evolution of industrial age war. The precision-guided munition, popularly
known as the "smart bomb," heralds for some the weaponry of the information age. The deeper expression of any age,
however, can generally be found in the organization and culture of the warfighting community. Some propose that
hierarchical command structures and ponderous military-industrial bureaucracies, created to fit industrial age needs,
must now give way to the decentralized, "flattened" business network of the information age. The success of
businesses that have adapted to the new world of networked computing, communications, and data processing--and the
failure of those that have not--seem to the Pentagon's reform-minded Young Turks to be compelling arguments in
favor of introducing commercial processes and procedures into the military.
But there are liabilities associated with moving too rapidly to reengineer the force around new technologies without
first considering interests and risks. A view that is too techno-centric risks revisiting such flawed experiments as the
Army's Pentomic division of the 1950s, the 280mm atomic cannon, the flying jeep, and the jet-pack-powered
infantryman. The appearance of new weapons and new technologies has sometimes caused military leaders and
theorists to make errors in judgment, misreading the meaning of the new technology and producing poor returns on the
investment, whether on the battlefield or in the view of history.[4]
Technology and Military Theory
Some attribute current interest in Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist and philosopher of war, to the advent of the
information age and its military subset, "information war." This may seem curious, for Sun Tzu lived some 2500 years
before the invention of the computer, the fiber-optic cable, or the orbital satellite. What appeals to many current
military writers is Sun Tzu's simple, aphoristic approach to warfare based on the principles of superior intelligence,
deception, and knowledge of the mind of one's enemy. Current theorists therefore conclude that the new mode of
warfare ushered in by the information revolution will have sweeping effects on the conduct of war in the near future.
Precision weapons will be directed at the enemy's decisive point(s) at the critical moment through "information
superiority." Superiority, in turn, will occur through space, near-space, and ground-based sensing technologies that will
transmit attack instructions in real time via a "system of systems" that links all parts of the battlespace. Some even
predict that the new technologies will penetrate, if not lift, the fog of war.
The more radical of the theorists predict that information warfare will not only provide dominant awareness of the
battlespace; it will also allow us to manipulate, exploit, or disable enemy information systems electronically. The intent
here evidently is to knock an enemy senseless--literally--and leave him at the mercy not only of conventional kinetic
attack, but of psychological operations aimed at controlling his perceptions and decisionmaking abilities. Public
opinion is to be shaped, leaders will be cut off from citizens, and the mind of the enemy will be directly penetrated and
his strategy defeated. In the ideal case all this will occur bloodlessly, fulfilling Sun Tzu's goal of victory without battle.
At least that's the theory.
Unlike Sun Tzu, whose timelessness owes much to his lack of tactical or technical advice, most military theorists of
the past 500 years have based their work on either specific technologies or scientific assumptions peculiar to the
prevailing thinking of their age. This may seem axiomatic, but it is worth considering--given the fact that many of
them sought enduring wisdom in their work. Machiavelli, whose insights into military character and the importance of
political motives in war prefigures the thinking of Clausewitz, deemphasized the technical aspects of warfare. His
exception, however, seems to prove the rule. The theorists that followed him--continuing to this day--demonstrate a
predilection for technical fixes.

. The renaissance and the emergence of the scientific revolutions of the 16th and 17th centuries stimulated a
fascination with the machine which extended beyond the realm of science and technology proper into the culture and,
inevitably, into the making of war. Engineers and mathematicians, among them Galileo and Niccolo Tartaglia,
attempted to develop ballistic equations that would refine the blunt and unpredictable force of artillery. Advocates of
artillery, which had become progressively more effective starting in the 15th century, believed that it would dominate

all wars in the future, sweeping away the age of cavalry and diminishing the importance of the foot soldier.

. The preeminent military theorist of the 17th century was an engineer, Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban, the master of
siegecraft and fortification. Vauban produced no theoretical writings on the nature of war or the integration of new
technical innovations into strategy. A technologist, he was concerned only with the creation of plans and formulae for
the successful attack of enemy fortresses and the protection of one's own. The study of war in this age of science and
reason had become detached from theoretical underpinnings. It used a purely quantitative means of analysis to focus on
tools and methods of applying them.
. The tradition of "scientific" war reached its theoretical apogee during the Industrial Revolution in the writing of
Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini. Jomini, who served as Chief of Staff to Marshall Ney, analyzed Napoleon's
campaigns in a search for the unchanging principles and practices of war. He believed that quasi-mathematical
concepts dictated the proper organization of military formations, and the direction and size of attack at the "decisive
point." War was, for Jomini, reducible to propositions that were universally true and universally applicable across the
spectrum of military conflict, much as any natural compound could be smelted into its elemental nature and thus
understood. And despite his embrace of scientific principles, Jomini's decline as an enduring military thinker was due
in large measure to his neglect of specific technological innovations. Rifled arms, high-explosive shells, machine guns,
and later mobile armor and air power rendered his supposedly immutable rules about "interior lines" and the geometry
of the battlefield highly dubious.

. Carl von Clausewitz, Jomini's 19th-century rival, has held up well by comparison. He, like Sun Tzu and Machiavelli,
focused less on military technology or contemporary intellectual fads (like Jomini's Newtonianism), and more on war
as an eternal human phenomenon, not rational but capricious, not reducible but complex . . . in short, a human
activity.[5] He rejected quantitative analysis and scientific formulae in favor of philosophical insights. Clausewitz's
concept of "friction" as inherent in war, his belief that in every battle and in every war there is a "culminating point,"
and his insistence upon recognizing the passionate, violent nature of conflict are not bound to any age. Unlike most of
the technical theorists, Clausewitz was mainly concerned with the ultimate goals of conflict. Thus his insistence on the
political nature of war and the oft-quoted aphorism that war is "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."[6]

. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the prophet of sea power in the late 19th century, was concerned with grand strategy,
specifically that of the United States in its development as a world power. Mahan's views on the importance of
geography, trading economies, and styles of government are clouded by his obsessive promotion of sea power to the
neglect of land power. The new technology of the steam gunship and a selective reading of military history convinced
him of the absolute primacy of sea power in ensuring the commercial and military success of nations, and caused him
to dismiss the importance of railways and the growing significance of motor transport on land.[7] Nor did he pay
much attention to the development of torpedoes and submarines, which promised to make armored capital ships
vulnerable to attack.[8] Like his strategic inspiration, Jomini, he continued to insist on permanent scientific principles
of naval strategy which would remain unchanged regardless of technical alterations to the equation.
Some may recall that even Clausewitz wrote extensively of tactics and operations. Who has studied his chapters on
"Attack of Convoys" or "Defense of Swamps"? These sections of On War are seldom read and justifiably so; wed to
their particular time and place, they are now of mere historical interest and largely irrelevant to the making of modern
war. So we tend to overlook his neglect of sea power, as egregious in a sense as is Mahan's ignoring land power,
because of Clausewitz's transcendent insights. Mahan, captured by a long-gone technological moment and the zeitgeist
of a forgotten age, does not appeal today because he lacks Clausewitz's reach and depth.

. Air Marshal Giulio Douhet was the last great military techno-prophet before the advent of nuclear weapons (which
produced their own generation of influential strategic thinkers) and before the current crop of information warfare
theorists. Even before World War I, Douhet saw the potential of aviation as a transformational technology in war. His
mature writings, from the 1920s, predicted the emergence of air power as the dominant realm of war and the aerial
bomber as the predominant tool:

The brutal but inescapable conclusion that we must draw is this: in the face of the technical development
of aviation today, in case of war the strongest army we can deploy in the Alps and strongest navy we can
dispose on our seas will prove no effective defense against the determined efforts of the enemy to bomb
our cities.[9]
Douhet anticipated rapid strikes by aerial bombers that would devastate defenseless cities, causing terrified societies
and demoralized national governments to capitulate before any counterattack could be mounted. Defenses against air
power were bound to fail; they were a waste of resources, he said, based on what he had seen during World War I.
Armies and navies, ponderous and surface bound, were virtually useless because wars were likely to be won or lost in
the air before fleets could be put to sea or armies mobilized. He tells us unequivocally:
If I may be so bold, I have mathematical certainty that the future will confirm my assertion that aerial
warfare will be the most important element in future wars, and that in consequence not only will the
importance of the Independent Air Force rapidly increase, but the importance of the army and navy will
decrease in proportion.[10]
Mathematical certainty?
Information Warfare: Prelude to Revolution
The revolution in information technology, from the transistor through widespread digitization toward global
socioeconomic revolution via deeply networked communications, has profoundly influenced analysts and planners in
and out of uniform. It has also produced a cottage industry in information warfare concepts, studies, and proposals as
the military attempts to understand, derive principles and theories for, and apply the new technologies. The frequently
confusing nature of these products stems from three principle sources: the rapidity of technological change; the very
nature of information and information technology, which blurs distinctions between civil and military use and targets;
and uncertainty about the nature of information warfare itself.[11] As with the air power revolution, new and
apparently revolutionary information technologies promise an immense effect on the conduct of war. And as with air
power, theorists are emerging to wrestle with the nature of information age war, seeking clues as to how it might
change the shape of conflict in general.
The Persian Gulf War afforded the average American his first (albeit filtered) glimpse of the future of warfare.
Millions were treated to precision-guided bombs annihilating targets in downtown Baghdad, learned of satellite
uplinks from the battlefield that provided real-time connectivity, and applauded the ability of stealth aircraft to ensure
aerial dominance. These outcomes were enabled by battlefield tracking and targeting systems that allowed American
forces to identify and attack targets well beyond the line of sight, by advanced aerial reconnaissance from airborne
warning and control systems (AWACS) and from joint surveillance and target attack radar systems (JSTARS), and by
space-based satellite sensors. The latter provided highly accurate battlefield information to combatants, tightening
decision cycles and dramatically accelerating the tempo of combat. Everyone seemed to understand that something was
different about this "videogame war"; there was much more to the spectacle than the immediacy of Vietnam's
television war 20 years earlier.
Since Desert Storm there have been orders-of-magnitude improvements in technological capabilities. For example, the
system used by Gulf War commanders to transmit messages could move 2400 bits of information per second. The
current commercially developed and operated Global Broadcast System transmits 23 million bits per second into
Bosnia. A message that took more than an hour to send in 1991 can now be sent in less than a second.[12] The
challenge for the US military and for political leaders has been to keep up with the pace of change in information
technologies generated by innovations in the commercial, not defense, market and driven by consumer, not warfighter,
demand. The convergence of digitized information, computers, networks, cellular communications, satellites, precision
munitions, and data fusion technologies has translated into quantifiable improvements in volumes of data exchanged,
experimental concepts, and testbed programs.
The idea of an information-based military technical revolution is reflected in increased understanding of what is
happening on the battlefield and improved ability to apply destructive force when and where we want to. These

capabilities are built upon specific technologies, such as improvements in sensors carried on advanced AWACS and
JSTARS, unoccupied aerial vehicles, or electro-optical satellites with one-foot image resolution and wide-area
coverage. Others include intelligent fusion of data products by combining artificial intelligence with "knowledge
bases" to process, manipulate, and tailor information for specific user needs; "sensor to shooter" couplings (automatic
target recognition capabilities are not far off); and integrated, high-speed, high-capacity battlefield communications
capabilities via the aforementioned Global Broadcast System (GBS) and the Global Command and Control System
(GCCS), both of which are designed to provide the right information to the right user at the right time and place.
Mastery of information and information processes leads naturally to increases in precision and lethality. The quest for
battlespace omniscience can improve tracking and targeting capabilities, aggravating the adversary's problem of
finding sanctuary. What can be seen, in the parlance of military analysts, can be hit; with these new information
technologies, nearly everything that is not hidden can be seen and is therefore vulnerable. The current revolution in
information technologies promises military leaders an extraordinary extension of previous battlespace awareness,
information dissemination capabilities, and ubiquitous "smart" weapons. Together they offer the ability to know what
is happening, what is important, where the points of maximum leverage are, and connection to the means to apply
force at those points, all on a vastly compressed time scale.
To appreciate the magnitude of these changes, recall that as recently as the 1970s reconnaissance was conducted by
manned aircraft or ground patrols. Both called in data that were plotted on maps for analysis by intelligence experts.
Hours at best, more likely days or weeks, could elapse before critical information was sufficiently processed to be
forwarded to planes in the air or soldiers in the field. In Panama in 1989 things had still not changed substantially.
Today, digital 3-D map representations could provide a complete picture of the battlespace to every friendly
combatant, updated as events occur. Satellite imagery, or live video from an unoccupied aerial vehicle (UAV)
equipped with a digital camera, is potentially available in real-time to a soldier in the field via a ruggedized laptop
computer and a global positioning system (GPS) receiver. The soldier and his comrades could then synchronize their
actions with the flow of battle, unaided by the traditional hierarchical and bureaucratic command and control system.
Automatic target recognition systems currently in prototype may eventually remove most of the middlemen in such an
environment, directing long-range precision strikes as soon as information is received from the sensor. All this is
perceived to occur without human intervention. If these concepts mature, decision cycles for commanders and soldiers
would be both compressed and enriched, accelerating the tempo of warfighting, demanding more initiative-based,
decentralized decisionmaking, reducing personnel in the field and on the staff, and eliminating much of the noise,
error, and viscosity normally inserted by human links. These communications and intelligence-gathering advantages
also would be available during any non-combat operation in which our 21st-century forces might participate:
humanitarian, peace enforcement, or support of domestic authorities.
Given the seemingly decisive comparative advantage which information technologies offer the possessor, the intrinsic
value of data and information would seem to be on the rise. The Gulf War suggested how new awareness and faster
targeting capabilities relative to adversary capabilities could translate into a smashingly decisive victory in the field.
Therefore, the new technologies--highly sophisticated and integrated, vulnerable to both kinetic and electronic
disruption--will themselves become objects of war. Hence the enthusiasm for information warfare.
While intelligence and operations security have always been important in wartime, and lines of communications have
always been targets, current thinking establishes the preeminence of "information superiority." According to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff publication Joint Vision 2010: "We must have information superiority: the capability to collect, process,
and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the
same."[13] So by announcing that the sine qua non for success in future conflicts is "information superiority," we have
defined new vulnerabilities and targets for the attack and for the defense.
Battlefield employment, exploitation, and targeting, and protection of the means of gaining and maintaining
superiority, presently define the conventional range of the information warfare spectrum. The various Pentagon
permutations--command and control warfare (C2W); command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I);
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)--describe the
realm of traditional warfare. They are reflected in the addition of new information technologies to units trained for

traditional force-on-force combat. The popular image is that of a soldier with a wearable computer and a GPS
terminal, calling in long-range precision strikes. But beyond this image, and to many the more revolutionary and
important aspect of information warfare, are the vulnerabilities of national and military infrastructures that rely on a
host of modern automation and information technologies.
The information revolution is driven by the changes that information technologies are creating as they are integrated
into the cultural, economic, and civic life of society. Essential national infrastructures such as telecommunications,
transportation, electrical power, emergency services, and food, water, and fuel distribution are dependent on digital,
software-based systems that are controlled through networked, publicly accessible communications interfaces.
International commercial and financial transactions are increasingly dependent on electronic networks. It has been
estimated that 62 million Americans now use the Internet to communicate, bank, shop, and do business.[14]
Public switched networks on which essential public and commercial infrastructures depend have shown themselves
vulnerable to penetration, disruption, and manipulation. Furthermore, a combination of cost concerns and the
superiority of established commercial systems has created a situation in which an estimated 95 percent of all military
communications travel over commercial systems. With the recent completion of an accord on telecommunications
deregulation, these networks become subject to foreign ownership and control. In these changes lie the concerns that
America, the most sophisticated, highly networked information age economy and society, has become vulnerable to an
"electronic Pearl Harbor."
From Technology to Theory and Doctrine: Competing Concepts of Information Warfare
Definitions of information warfare are abundant and protean. The most recent Department of Defense definition
describes information warfare (IW) as "information operations (IO) conducted during time of crisis or conflict to
achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries."[15] According to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
IW can be waged in wartime within and beyond the traditional military battlefield. As a subset of IW,
command and control warfare (C2W) is an application of IW in military operations that specifically
attacks and defends the C2 target set. However, the capabilities and disciplines employed in C2W
(psychological operations [PSYOP], deception, operations security, and electronic warfare) as well as
other less traditional ones focused on information systems can be employed to achieve IW objectives that
are outside the C2 target set.[16]
This attempt to define the information-based revolution for national security policymakers and warfighters is
multilayered, a bit confusing, and apparently deliberately vague. Agreeing that IW is a field with the potential for great
effect, perhaps the linchpin of a revolution in military affairs, questions still abound about how it will affect military
culture and future conflicts. While issues of integration remain problematic, the spectrum of possibilities may be laid
out as follows. At the most incremental level of change, there are those who would overlay new and near-future
technologies on current military systems. Such an effort can be seen in the "digital battlefield" of the US Army's
"Force XXI," and the robust, highly detailed Department of Defense "Advanced Battlespace Information System."[17]
These programs perceive information technology as a powerful force multiplier for kinetic warfare that would not in
itself be substantially changed from the heyday of industrial age war.
Others have suggested that the nascent information-based revolution in military affairs will eventually make possible
radical reform of military organizations and tactical doctrines while still operating within the traditional parameters of
warfare--dominating an adversary on a physical battlefield. Such approaches can be found in the "Army After Next"
project, the Marine Corps' "Sea Dragon" concept, the Navy's "Forward . . . from the Sea," and the Air Force's "New
World Vistas." The concept was developed most fully in 1996 through the Defense Science Board's "Summer Study on
Tactics and Technology for 21st Century Military Superiority." The report envisioned restructuring US ground forces
into small "distributed combat cells" rather than hefty battalions and divisions, their warfighting power multiplied by
sensors, robotic systems, precision logistics, and the ability to call in long-range precision firepower from land, sea, or
air. All of these changes were of course predicated on a robust information infrastructure.[18]
Finally, where science fiction meets science fact, there is the emerging concept of "cyberwar": conflict in the purely

digital realm consisting of remote attacks on critical information nodes, links, and databases to disrupt, exploit, disable,
or deny service. Information warfare of this sort would also include deception and psychological operations at a much
higher level of subtlety and effectiveness than expected in conventional operations, given the manipulability of digital
information. Combinations of all of the foregoing concepts appear in multiple-fence-straddling positions such as the
one established above by the Joint Staff.
Theories of Information Warfare
So what do the theorists expect in a future adapted to the emerging information age? The answer presently seems to be
faith in the future of information technologies to produce revolutionary changes in military affairs and the conduct of
war.

. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, two of the first and best, have produced a number of intellectually rich articles,
most of them examining the twin concepts of "cyberwar" and "netwar."[19] In their view, cyberwar refers to an
information-enriched style of future military conflict in which the struggle for information dominance holds the key to
victory. Netwar, the more heady form of future conflict, refers to inter-societal contests of perceptions and national
messages. Arquilla and Ronfeldt are well known for their comparison of information warfare to the "decapitation"
techniques employed during the 13th century by the Mongols, who used superior speed and lines of communication to
control numerically superior enemies located over a wide area. In this context, cyberwar would allow a network of
decentralized information warriors to achieve decisive, bloodless victory--a sort of post-industrial blitzkrieg--by
directly targeting an adversary's information "nerve centers." Netwar in theory could prevent real wars (or cyberwars)
by allowing for deterrent posturing and for control over potential adversaries' perceptions.

. Another group of theorists--George Stein, Richard Szafranski, and Owen Jensen--are associated with the Air
University at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. Much of their theoretical work has appeared in Airpower Journal,
a hotbed of discussion of information warfare. In general this group maintains that the highest potential of information
warfare is as a new realm of conflict in which information (or knowledge) itself is both the center of gravity and the
principal weapon. This type of futuristic conflict would occur in a transformed environment; weapon platforms as we
now know them would be outmoded. No digitized battlefield, no info-tech applique on existing systems, but something
fundamentally different.
To paraphrase their ideas, information warfare would assume an autonomous role in "information campaigns" far
beyond its application as a force multiplier in more linear military evolutions. Emerging information technologies
might allow us to battle the mind of the enemy via customized propaganda, morphing reality into a fictive universe
which we serve up through diversified information networks. These theorists suggest that information warfare, not
unlike Arquilla and Ronfeldt's concept of netwar, would be a high-tech, more sophisticated form of psychological
operations and propaganda, directed at mass or niche audiences. They conclude that technology will be used to control
an opponent through strategic information dominance: tailoring his information content to suit our interests,
conditioning his knowledge and understanding of the situation, ideally without his awareness.[20] As defined by the
Maxwell school, information warfare seems to be the functional equivalent of conventional concepts of strategic air
power.[21]

. Martin Libicki, a standard-setter on the subject of information warfare who has worked harder than most to bridge
the gap between ideas and action, has suggested that information may ultimately prove to be a universal deterrent to
war because of the global transparency that it will foster. He suggests that a network of satellites, and of air, ground,
and sea-based sensors, will ring the earth, affording a God's eye view of the world and all its activities. A global
information infrastructure will link users of this information, ensuring a sort of universal awareness of military and
other activity. Under such conditions, any border incursions or sudden mobilization would be sensed and could be
thwarted immediately, ostensibly by exposing and threatening the would-be aggressor. Were the aggressor to persist,
the international community would only have to dam up the aggressor's bitstreams and the information flows essential
to his war effort, economy, and national infrastructures. Such procedures would (ideally) curb his ambitions without
firing a shot.[22]

These authors are exploring new ways of thinking about war and warfare in an era of change. They are to be
commended for attempting to expand the intellectual horizons of often parochial, hide-bound military and civilian
bureaucracies. The assumptions of many of these theorists, however, are highly dependent on the technological
innovations of the moment. Even emphasizing as some do, recalling Sun Tzu, that the real object of information
warfare is the human mind, the visions they present are unattainable without the array of new and emerging
technologies assumed to be part of a fully netted information age world.
Our ability to combat or deter adversaries using cyberspace tools is predicated on their being as reliant on information
technologies as we are. Threatening to cut off a hostile neighbor's bitstreams will be credible only if two conditions are
met. The first is that he is largely dependent upon them for survival; the second is that we have the ability to turn them
off. Little of value will be accomplished by niche-casting propaganda at a nation that lacks satellite television or an
Internet connection. As recently as 1997, it has been suggested, half the world's population had never even made a
telephone call. Similarly, strategic psychological operations, no matter how overwhelming and sophisticated
technologically, are likely to be far more effective in a democracy than in the authoritarian states that currently present
many of our most significant security threats: Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. In fact, it is interesting that such a
strategy would appeal to an American theorist because it is our highly democratic, media-saturated, and
technologically sophisticated society that is most vulnerable to a counterattack.
Some information warfare theorists have attempted to shield themselves from accusations of technological
determinism by suggesting that we need not follow slavishly the technology wave. Rather, we should use our
imaginations to determine what we want it do for us and then develop the technology to fit those needs. This ignores
the fact that technology development, much like the formulation of strategy and tactics, is a coevolutionary process.
New technologies emerge to either exploit or compensate for weaknesses in existing technologies. Inventing a theory
of information warfare risks falling victim to the kinds of fallacies that Douhet encountered. Unable to see the future,
he imagined one based on linear projections of extant technologies. Unable or unwilling to imagine counter-air
defenses, or the limitations of strategic bombing in the face of a determined foe, he saw only a pristine view of air
power, conducting operations with impunity against helpless, terror-stricken citizens.
Technology and the Current Revolution in Military Affairs
Technology-driven changes in military affairs are transient, sometimes eclipsed in less than a generation, and the
competitive advantages that they offer are increasingly fleeting. Andrew Krepinevich, one of the leading thinkers in
this area, has identified ten technology "revolutions" from the advent of infantry warfare to the birth of nuclear
weapons.[23] Steven Metz and James Kievit of the US Army War College have divided military "revolutions" into
major and minor forms. The first are mostly technology driven and malleable; the others ride on broader
socioeconomic "waves."[24] It is clear that specific technologies have sometimes had significant effects on the conduct
of warfare; gunpowder, internal combustion engines, breech-loading mechanisms, radio, and radar are among the most
memorable. But war remains essentially what it has been for centuries: Clausewitz's "act of force to compel our enemy
to do our will."
In a century that began with active cavalry regiments and ends with nuclear arms, stealth aircraft, and theories of
information warfare, progress has been continuous and evolutionary. In Machiavelli's time, improvements in artillery
led enthusiasts to predict that it would supplant all other tools of war. Five hundred years later, artillery is still
improving, and it still plays a subordinate role in combat operations. So perhaps it is too much to expect truly
revolutionary new technologies to lead to fundamental changes in the forms and functions of conflict.
The German blitzkrieg is sometimes offered as a compelling example of creative minds deriving a competitive edge
over adversaries by astute application of technology to the problems of land warfare. The Germans combined armor,
radio communications, and tactical air support to remarkable effect in Poland, the low countries, and France during
1939-40. But once others had an opportunity to analyze their techniques and methods, the edge was lost. As the
Germans later drove into Soviet territory, their logistics train was stretched beyond endurance and the army, in effect,
became "de-modernized." The blitzkrieg--material intensive and dependent on frequent resupply to maintain
communications, mobility, and combined arms capabilities--fell apart, and the war in the east degenerated into a slow,
brutal contest of attrition.[25] The benefits of technological edges can be fleeting indeed.

The 1997 "Army After Next" winter wargame, which featured a face-off between the United States and a peer
competitor, began with two surprises: a laser attack on US space-based satellite reconnaissance, GPS, and
communications capabilities, followed closely by a nuclear electro-magnetic pulse burst in space. The combined
effects of these unexpected initiatives reduced by 50 percent the military information infrastructure on which most of
our new weapon systems are dependent.
Predictions about the effects of technology are almost always erroneous, even when the technology involved justifies
the designation "revolutionary." The airplane, an unprecedented technological breakthrough which added a new
dimension to the battlespace, repeatedly has been shown to be insufficient in and of itself to transform war. Contrary to
Douhet's assertions, command of the air has certainly not made armies and navies obsolete. And as Michael Howard
has pointed out, when the Allies bombed the cities of Germany toward the end of World War II and the conduct of
strategic air war most closely approached Douhet's vision, it not only failed to force the enemy to capitulate, but
actually hardened resistance.[26]
Clausewitz reminds us that the human elements of war are extraordinarily difficult to gauge. If necessity is the mother
of invention, asymmetric tactics, strategy, or technological countermeasures will always upset the best laid technologybased plans. Nuclear weapons were supposed to make conventional arms obsolete and totally revolutionize warfare.
Massive retaliation, the Eisenhower-era strategy for their deployment, ignored conventional capabilities only to find
that the will to use weapons of mass destruction was lacking. Dirty little wars on the periphery continued and guerrillas
flourished, despite our fearsome nuclear arsenal and the threat of certain annihilation we wielded. Our bluff was called
in Korea and later in Vietnam, and the nukes remained holstered. Soldiers at the dusk of the industrial age faced the
same mud and mayhem that had confronted their counterparts during the Napoleonic wars at its dawn.
Technological advantages in war have generally proven ephemeral; neither can a technology-driven theory of war or
strategy for war hold sway for very long. Nor do old weapons necessarily go out of style--new tools are just added to
the box. Technology-driven revolutions in military affairs entail the reorganization of forces and doctrine around those
new technologies. Anyone who believes that the nature and rate of change qualify for designation as "revolutionary"
should read their mandate carefully and proceed cautiously. It is important to grasp the functional significance of
technological innovations; it is equally important that risks and vulnerabilities--the stuff of strategy--remain foremost
in assessing their political and military implications. The most durable military theory focuses less on the latest
technology and more on the infinite complexity of the user.
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